Organisational doxing.

/Organisational doxing.

Forging thousands — or more — documents is difficult to pull off, but slipping a single forgery in an actual cache is much easier. The attack could be something subtle. Maybe a country that anonymously publishes another country’s diplomatic cables wants to influence yet a third country, so adds some particularly egregious conversations about that third country. Or the next hacker who steals and publishes email from climate change researchers invents a bunch of over-the-top messages to make his political point even stronger. Or it could be personal: someone dumping email from thousands of users making changes in those by a friend, relative, or lover.

Imagine trying to explain to the press, eager to publish the worst of the details in the documents, that everything is accurate except this particular email. Or that particular memo. That the salary document is correct except that one entry. Or that the secret customer list posted up on WikiLeaks is correct except that there’s one inaccurate addition. It would be impossible. Who would believe you? No one. And you couldn’t prove it.

Bruce Schneier on disinformation.

 

So y’all know how much time you spent obsessing over the Clinton emails? Yeah. About that…

2016-11-23T07:47:36+00:0027th November, 2016|Tags: infosec, politics|

3 Comments

  1. inkteller 2nd December, 2016 at 3:19 am

Comments are closed.